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GOING ONLINE WITH TELEMEDICINE: WHAT BARRIERS EXIST AND HOW 
MIGHT THEY BE RESOLVED? 
 
© 2015 Pierron Tackes* 
With the advancement of telecommunications, telemedicine has been pushed to the 
forefront of medical practices by the federal government as a solution to the United States health 
care system’s historical issues of limited access to health care and spiraling health care delivery 
costs.1  Telemedicine is defined by the World Health Organization as “the delivery of health care 
services, where distance is a critical factor, by all health care professionals using information and 
communication technologies for the exchange of valid information for diagnosis, treatment and 
prevention of disease and injuries.”2  It is a tool being used by a broad spectrum of medical fields, 
acting as versatile solution for various health disparities facing today’s global populations. In 
practice, telemedicine can take a variety of forms.  Most commonly, patients will seek care at a 
clinic, meeting with a nurse, physicians’ assistant, or trained technician, and then that provider 
will call or engage in a video chat with a licensed physician who considers the information 
gathered by the provider and who issues an order for care.  In 2010, a study of industrialized 
nations concluded that the U.S. ranked lowest in “quality, efficiency, access to care, equity, and                                                         
* Professor Christina Juris Bennett, J.D., assisted in advising and editing this article.  Professor 
Bennett is a professor at the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center, College of Public 
Health and an adjunct professor at the University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119; Sharon Klein 
& Jee-Young Kim, Telemedicine and Mobile Health Innovations Amid Increasing Regulatory 
Oversight, WESTLAW J. HEALTH CARE FRAUD, Sept. 24, 2014, 20 No. 3 Westlaw Journal Health 
Care Fraud 9. 
2 WORLD HEALTH ORG., TELEMEDICINE: OPPORTUNITIES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN MEMBER 
STATES: REPORT ON THE SECOND GLOBAL SURVEY ON EHEALTH 9 (2009), available at 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2010/9789241564144_eng.pdf?ua=1.  
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the ability to lead long, healthy, productive lives,” marking that while the nation may be a global 
leader in most contexts, the U.S. is greatly behind when it comes to the health of our nation.3  
This trifecta of issues – limited access, high cost, and poor quality – can be attributed to the 
complex environment of medical care in the United States, in which insurance companies, state 
medical boards, physicians and consumers each have differing priorities and perceptions of how 
health care delivery should work.  By maximizing the ability of telemedicine to deliver care over 
geographic distances and maximizing the efficiency of health providers’ offices, telemedicine 
acts a potential solution to issues of access, efficiency, and cost for health care in the United 
States.     
This timely solution, however, does not come without its fair share of obstacles.  With 
questions of interstate licensing, medical malpractice, consumer privacy, and others, 
telemedicine receives push back from a number of stakeholders.  State medical boards resist 
interstate telemedicine use, as it threatens their authority to regulate medical practices and 
infringes on their potential pool of patients.4  Consumers also have concerns over the privacy of 
their medical records in a time when breaches in technology are far too common.5  Additionally, 
                                                        
3 Mary Mahon & Bethanne Fox, U.S. Ranks Last Among Seven Countries on Health System 
Performance Based on Measures of Quality, Efficiency, Access, Equity, and Healthy Lives, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND (June 16, 2014), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/press-
releases/2014/jun/us-health-system-ranks-last. 
4 LATOYA THOMAS & GARY CAPISTRANT, AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N, 50 STATE TELEMEDICINE 
GAPS ANALYSIS: PHYSICIAN PRACTICE STANDARDS & LICENSURE (2015), available at 
http://www.americantelemed.org/docs/default-source/policy/50-state-telemedicine-gaps-
analysis--physician-practice-standards-licensure.pdf?sfvrsn=6 (noting every state has imposed a 
policy that makes practicing medicine across state lines difficult; D.C., Maryland, New York, 
and Virginia are the only states that allow licensure reciprocity from bordering states, and ten 
other states extend a conditional or telemedicine license to out-of-state physicians). 
5 Don Detmer et al., Integrated Personal Health Records: Transformative Tools for Consumer-
Centric Care, BMC MEDICAL INFORMATICS & DECISION MAKING (Oct. 6, 2008), 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1472-6947-8-45.pdf (noting that real and perceived 
concerns with electronic records of personal information is privacy and security breaches). 
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doctors and consumers alike have concerns related to medical malpractice – for instance, in rem 
jurisdiction for negligence suits when the physician practicing is out-of-state or criminal liability 
for a provider when the provider’s home state and practicing state have different medical practice 
laws.  The federal government has a high stake in the success of telemedicine, due to the benefits 
in cost, access and efficiency, and it is working to develop solutions to resolve the many barriers 
and promote national support for the technology.   
In Part I, this analysis will describe how state medical boards restrict use of both 
interstate and intrastate telemedicine through legislatively-delegated authority to regulate the 
licensure and practice of state medical practitioners.  Part II will examine how the federal 
government encourages national use of telemedicine and will provide suggestions about how the 
federal government could further this support.  And lastly, Part III will examine how a national 
mandate for arbitration of telemedicine claims may act as a potential solution to health care 
providers’, consumers’ and insurance companies’ hesitance to use telemedicine services. 
I.  State Medical Board Authority 
Telemedicine is accompanied by a long list of barriers for its implementation and 
widespread use, including the prominent barrier of overbearing state medical boards.  Many 
states guard their statutory right to regulate medical practice standards by prohibiting physicians 
from practicing interstate telemedicine and by limiting intrastate telemedicine use.6  As with any 
                                                        
6 AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N, STATE POLICY TOOLKIT: IMPROVING ACCESS TO COVERED SERVICES 
FOR TELEMEDICINE (n.d.), available at http://www.americantelemed.org/docs/default-
source/policy/ata-state-telemedicine-toolkit---coverage-and-reimbursement.pdf?sfvrsn=4 (noting 
forty-six states have some coverage of telemedicine health); AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N,  
MEDICAL LICENSURE AND PRACTICE REQUIREMENTS (June 2011), available at 
http://www.americantelemed.org/docs/default-source/policy/ata-policy-on-state-medical-
licensure-and-practice-requirements.pdf (noting that in the past few years fourteen states have 
strengthened telemedicine licensing requirements and very few have worked to develop 
interstate licensing laws for neighboring states). 
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major shift in the health care system, new implementations face new obstacles and tensions 
between stakeholders.  However, as legislators propose policies to resolve licensing and 
reimbursement issues, the issue of state medical boards’ authority to regulate medical practice 
standards is often underestimated. 
State legislatures delegate to their medical boards the authority to regulate medical 
licensure and practice, which includes the use of telemedicine by physicians. 7   With the 
delegation of such broad authority to these state boards, the legislature also vests these boards 
with adjudicative and rulemaking powers, thereby making the profession self-regulated and 
autonomous. 8   For telemedicine, this authority means state medical boards may have an 
unrestricted power to determine how and if telemedicine services are practiced.  This analysis 
will explore the effect that state medical boards’ authority may have on the growth of 
telemedicine, and how their broad discretion is often politics-based instead of science-based. 
A.  Delegation of Medical Board Authority 
To better understand how state medical board authority has grown to be overbearing, 
consideration must be given to its necessity when first created.  The Supreme Court first upheld 
the independent actions of a state medical board in 1889, holding that every state has an interest 
                                                        
7 Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 191 (1898) (noting that “within the acknowledged reach 
of the police power, a State may prescribe the qualifications of one engaged in any business so 
directly affecting the lives and health of the people as the practice of medicine.”). 
8 See Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 170 (1923) (holding that the delegation professional 
regulatory powers to an administrative board is consistent with the U.S. Constitution). E.g. MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 147.01 (2005) (describing the Board of Medical Practice); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6523 
(McKinney 2001) (describing the State Board for Medicine).  See generally FED’N OF STATE 
MED. BDS., ELEMENTS OF A MODERN STATE MEDICAL AND OSTEOPATHIC BOARD § III (2012), 
available at 
http://www.fsmb.org/Media/Default/PDF/FSMB/Advocacy/GRPOL_Elements_Modern_Medica
l_Board.pdf.  
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in protecting its citizens through the regulation of medical licensure.9  The Court emphasized the 
importance of locality with regard to medical professionals and stated that “few professions 
require more careful preparation by one who seeks to enter it than that of medicine” and those 
individuals must be judged “by an authority competent to judge . . . that he possesses the 
requisite qualifications.”10  This case centered on a Fourteenth Amendment claim regarding the 
right to practice one’s chosen profession.  The Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment does 
provide that individual right, however the chosen profession may be subject to regulation.11 
Since 1889, the role of state medical boards has expanded from its early regulation of 
restricting the supply of physicians to those graduates of approved medical schools to a more 
complex participation in the consumer-driven health care market focused on physician 
performance, consumer-expectation and government involvement. 12   Today, medical boards 
work with a number of entities overseeing and monitoring the practices of many health care 
providers.  Additionally, their role extends into the realm of practice, as they now issue 
guidelines instructing doctors for proper pain management, controlled substance abuse, sexual 
misconduct, Internet prescription, alternative medicine and outpatient surgery.13 
Over the short history of telemedicine, state medical board issued rules have accumulated, 
limiting the use of telemedicine, both in scope of services that may be offered, as well as the 
                                                        
9 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889). 
10 Id. at 122-23. 
11 Id. at 123. 
12 Carl F. Ameringer, State Medical Boards and the Politics of Public Protection, 15 ISSUES L. & 
MED. 235 (1999) 
13 FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., FSMB POLICIES (June 2014), available at 
http://www.fsmb.org/policy/advocacy-policy/policy-documents (follow “2004: Model Policy for 
the Use of Controlled Substances in the Treatment of Pain” hyperlink; also “2006: Addressing 
Sexual Boundaries: Guidelines for State Medical Boards” hyperlink; also “2004: Model 
Guidelines for the Appropriate Use of the Internet in Medical Practice” hyperlink; also “2004: 
Report of the Special Committee on Outpatient (Office-Based) Surgery” hyperlink). 
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scope of cross-jurisdictional use.  The core functions of medical boards in protecting patients 
from incompetent physicians and protecting physicians from out-of-state competition are at odds 
with a rapidly developing technology that crosses jurisdictional lines to deliver health care.14  To 
the extent that concerns over professional territory override the objective of protecting the 
welfare of the public, state medical boards lose sight of their original purpose and risk 
interference with health care delivery. 
B.  Politically Driven 
With the recent implementation of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”),15 Americans have 
a broader opportunity of access to care.  This expansion is expected to put a strain on the number 
of physicians available to provide care – effectively limiting access to care for both those newly 
insured and previously insured.16  The use of telemedicine is expected to mitigate the shortage in 
two ways: (1) improve health care provider efficiency and (2) increase the geographic area that 
physicians can serve.  By providing the same care through a different medium, telemedicine will 
be consistent with the ACA focus on increasing access to health care for Americans.   
While interstate telemedicine implicates difficult licensing issues for states, it can still act 
as a useful health care medium through intrastate use by reaching those rural and otherwise 
difficult to reach citizens.  A state medical board issues licenses to physicians certifying that they 
are qualified and approved to provide care to patients within that state – an approval that is not                                                         
14 Physician Licensure: An Update of Trends, AM. MED. ASS'N (Sept. 11, 2010), 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-people/member-groups-sections/young-
physicians-section/advocacy-resources/physician-licensure-an-update-trends.shtml; Carl F. 
Ameringer, State-Based Licensure of Telemedicine: The Need for Uniformity but Not a National 
Scheme, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 55 (2011). 
15 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
16 See John D. Goodson, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Promise and Peril for 
Primary Care, 152 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 742, 742 (2010) (discussing the “urgent need” to 
expand primary care capacity since “a projected 32 million people will gain access to health care” 
as a result of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act). 
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specialty specific and presumably includes various forms of delivery.17  As the AMA notes, 
“whether a patient is seeing his or her physician in person or via telemedicine, the same 
standards of care must be maintained.”18  However, instead of translating state regulated medical 
standards to telemedicine, state medical boards can use their authority instead to prohibit uses of 
telemedicine.19 
By extending their authority past that of licensing, state medical boards use their 
authority to regulate medical practices to ensure that the medical environment of their state 
remains consistent with the medical board’s vision.  For instance, the board may require 
additional precautions for particular treatment after considering the FDA’s recommendations 
(this use of authority is beneficial to the welfare of that state’s public and is within the original 
spirit of the authority delegated to the boards).  Additionally, state medical boards have expanded 
their authority to physician disciplinary actions for violating state standards of medical practice.   
Again, this function ensures public protection from wayward physicians.  Where board authority 
fringes on reasonable limits, however, are instances where the board considers the opinions of 
leaders from religious groups and implements rules based on those opinions.  By allowing 
religious or political views to meddle with scientific and medical expertise, state medical boards 
illustrate a stretch of properly delegated power.  An example of such an instance, is that of the 
Iowa Board of Medicine, where the board favored the opinions of community and religious 
                                                        
17State-specific Requirements for Initial Medical Licensure, FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160313101145/http://fsmb.org/policy/public-
resources/state_specific (last visited Apr. 11, 2016). 
18 AMA Press Releases and Statements: AMA Adopts Telemedicine Policy to Improve Access to 
Care for Patients, AM. MED. ASS’N (June 11, 2014), http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/news/news/2014/2014-06-11-policy-coverage-reimbursement-for-
telemedicine.page. 
19 See supra note 13. 
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leaders rather than scientific medical studies to decide upon the political charged issue of 
abortion.  
C. Planned Parenthood of the Healthland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. Of Med., Iowa Dist. Ct. 
In August 2014, the Iowa District Court for Polk County found for the Iowa Board of 
Medicine, upholding a rule requiring physicians to be present and to perform a physical 
examination before certain drugs are dispensed.  The facts involved Planned Parenthood of the 
Heartland, Inc. (“PPH”) physicians using telemedicine to order RU-486 for the termination of 
pregnancies beyond the fiftieth day of gestation.20 
In 2008, PPH incorporated telemedicine into the standard procedures for the distribution 
of RU-486.  The patient-physician interaction was unaltered, except for the fact that the 
physician spoke with the patient via a real-time, two-way video conferencing system, as opposed 
to physically being in the exam room.  The physician, while interacting with the patient, had 
access to her ultrasound, blood lab work and physical exam details, which were performed by 
technicians who were at the clinic with the patient.  Once the physician had sufficiently 
evaluated the patient and determined that it was appropriate for RU-486 to be administered, the 
physician would electronically release a drawer in the patient’s room containing the drug, and 
the patient would then take the drug in front of the doctor, by video, and the PPH staff in the 
room.21  PHH implemented this use of telemedicine to increase the number of clinics available 
                                                        
20 Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. Of Med., No. CVCV 046429, Iowa Dist. 
Ct. for Polk County, (filed Aug. 18, 2014) available at 
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/IowaBOMruling.pdf. 
21 Id. at 4. 
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for women seeking to terminate their pregnancies, expanding access to women in rural 
communities in particular.22  
In June of 2013, the Iowa State Medical Board received a petition from fourteen 
individuals, only five of which were physicians, urging for the adoption of a policy requiring the 
physical presence of a physician at the time of the distribution of RU-486.23  PPH filed a petition 
for judicial review and motion for stay of agency action, basing their constitutional claims on 
both violations of agency due process and undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion access.24   
While this case centers on the historically and universally controversial topic of abortion, 
the court’s reasoning was unambiguous and the chance of success on appeal is minimal.25  The 
court held for the medical board, noting that there is “no question that the board has the power to 
establish standards of practice for the medical profession.” 26   The opinion provided the 
procedural steps taken by the medical board to adopt the rule, and the court found appropriate 
delegation of rulemaking authority and no arbitrary or capricious abuse of power.27   
The court additionally analyzed whether requiring a physician to physically be in the 
presence of a woman seeking an abortion through RU-486 would be an undue burden on 
abortion access.28  The landmark holding of Roe v. Wade established that women may choose to 
have an abortion before viability, with the Court adding a condition in Planned Parenthood of 
                                                        
22 Id. at 2 (noting that there are eleven abortion providers in Iowa, with services being offered in 
nine of Iowa’s ninety-nine counties).  
23 Id. at 6. 
24 Id.  
25 Supreme Court of Iowa Oral Arguments, Oral Argument Schedule, IOWA JUDICIAL BRANCH, 
http://www.iowacourts.gov/About_the_Courts/Supreme_Court/Oral_Argument_Schedule/ (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2016) (at the date of writing this article, the Supreme Court of Iowa has heard 
oral argument for the appeal of this case but has not yet issued an opinion). 
26 Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc., No. CVCV 046429, at 13. 
27 Id. at 16 (citing Doe v. Iowa Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 733 N.W.2d 705, 707 (Iowa 2007). 
28 Id. at 31-35 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). 
10  
Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, that states may regulate these procedures so long as the regulations 
are without “undue interference from the State.”29  The Iowa court analyzed the facts of this case 
using both the rational basis standards as dictated by Gonzalez v. Carhart, as well as the strict 
scrutiny test as suggested by the Fifth Circuit case, Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas v. 
Abbott.30  The Abbott court found that while the statutory changes would to increase travel to 
obtain an abortion by up to 150 miles to obtain an abortion, the law did not place an undue 
burden on a woman’s choice to seek an abortion.31  Similarly, the Iowa court here found that the 
medical board’s ban created no undue hardship.32  Using rational basis, the court found for the 
board as it “is authorized to adopt a standard of practice, and it did so in this instance on rational 
grounds.” 
Highlighting the breadth of the board’s authority is where the court addresses that the 
board failed to consider “its own past policy” concerning the PPH telemedicine program.  During 
trial, PPH presented evidence that the board had adopted a policy in 2010 that the telemedicine 
program was in fact safe and did not warrant disciplinary action. 33   PPH also introduced 
evidence of a study by Dr. Daniel Grossman, vice president of research for Ibis Reproductive 
Health, which concluded there was no statistically significant difference in the complication rates 
of medical abortion patients who saw a doctor in person versus by video conferencing. 34  
However, less than three (3) years after the board approved PPH’s specific use of telemedicine 
for the RU-486, the board retracted that approval and issued the rule at contention in this case.  
                                                        
29 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
30 Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007); Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical 
Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 590 (5th Cir. 2014). 
31 Id. 
32 Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc., No. CVCV 046429, at 32-33. 
33 Id. at 19. 
34 Id. at 5. 
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And deferring to the board’s decision making, the court responded that the board was authorized 
to make rules regardless of past treatment of medical practices by the board.   
While at trial, the board cited numerous reasons for passing the restrictive rule.  The top 
three (3) reasons included:  (1) in-person examinations were important to the health and safety of 
the public, (2) ultrasound quality issues could be resolved with an in-person exam and (3) a 
desire to strengthen the patient-physician relationships through an in-person exam.35  While there 
is merit in the board’s reasoning, there is a question of how it weighs against the evidence 
brought by PPH – a question that the court sidestepped, giving deference to the board.  In 
response to PPH’s argument that their medical procedure did in fact protect the health and 
welfare of the public, the court respectfully deferred to the board noting, “[I]t is not for the court 
to review medical studies and determine which is the most persuasive . . . the board’s reasoning 
is not unreasonable and must be granted deference by the court.”36  This deference is consistent 
with agency authority precedent, following that where decision-making authority is conferred 
upon an agency, it is not the court’s job to make the same conclusions, only to determine that the 
decisions were reasonable.37  The conclusion by the Iowa court is consistent with both abortion 
precedent and delegation of authority case law – however, it highlights the breadth of the 
medical board’s authority.  If the board wishes to limit the use of telemedicine, they have the 
power to do so. 
  
                                                        
35 Id. at 22-23. 
36 Id. at 24. 
37 See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (holding when decision 
making authority delegated to an agency, Congress must give an intelligible principle to which 
the agency must conform); see also Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984) (holding that where Congress has not given clear guidance, it is up to the agency to 
do so with their knowledge and expertise). 
12  
D. Other Explanations for Telemedicine Limitations 
An alternate reasoning for the rule passed by the Iowa Board of Medicine is that abortion 
procedures are controversial with the public.  Because of this added level of public scrutiny, 
medical boards may be cautious in expanding delivery to telemedicine not because of the 
technology of telemedicine, but rather the nature of the service being offered. 
Looking to other state medical boards and banned uses of the telemedicine, there is a 
consistent theme of banning certain telemedicine uses associated with risky health behaviors.  
The Nevada Board of Medical Examiners prohibits prescribing Viagra without personally 
conducting a physical examination of the patient.38  In North Carolina, the medical board ruled 
that prescribing drugs to an individual that the prescriber has not personally examined is usually 
inappropriate.39  While it is rational to require a physical examination for the prescription of 
drugs to ensure a certain standard of care, there is little evidence that any consideration of the 
quality of telemedicine care is being considered.  Where the role of the medical board is to 
protect the public from unsafe medical care, and the medical boards are ruling out a method of 
care before considering its quality, it would seem on the surface that either their core function 
has shifted or their decision-making authority is too broad.  
Rooted within the original purpose and traditional role of a state medical board is the idea 
of professional disciplinary minimalism.  That is, the goal of professional licensure and 
                                                        
38 Board’s Position on the Prescribing of Viagra, NEWSLETTER (Nev. Bd. Of Med. Examiners), 
Oct. 1998, available at http://epubs.nsla.nv.gov/statepubs/epubs/213935-1998-10.pdf. 
39 Position Statements: Contact with Patients Before Prescribing, N.C. MED. BD. (Nov. 1, 1999, 
updated June 2015), http://www.ncmedboard.org/resources-information/professional-
resources/laws-rules-position-statements/position-
statements/contact_with_patients_before_prescribing. 
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discipline guarantees the public a minimal level of competence in their physicians.40  Ensuring 
that a professional is licensed is simply assuring the public that the physician possesses the 
knowledge necessary to practice medicine – it does not go further to ensure that the physician is 
using that knowledge appropriately.  Rather, the second main function of medical boards – 
discipline – is the safeguard put in place to check the actions of licensed physicians.  By 
interjecting a rule making process in the middle of these two functions, medical boards are 
overstepping their purpose and self-appointing themselves as a legislative body.  While their 
decisions may be grounded in rational basis and motives of implementing inspirational standards 
of practice, medical board rulemaking poses a threat to innovative physicians seeking to advance 
more efficient and affordable means of health care delivery. 
E. State Medical Board Authority Going Forward 
The history of medical advances in the United States is marked by innovation, 
technological advances, and a working goal of providing the best possible care to the most 
people possible.  The history of state medical boards is marked by a gradual expansion of 
authority, allowing the boards to delegate to themselves a more invasive role into physicians’ 
practice within their jurisdictional boundaries.  These two histories are at tension with one 
another, and courts’ deference to the boards’ rule-making authority suggests that the authority of 
medical boards surpass the momentum of medically technological advances.  However, while 
state medical boards hold a powerful position with regard to the advancement of telemedicine, it 
is the states that possess the ultimate police power to ensure the health and welfare of the 
                                                        
40 Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical Discipline, 13 J. 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 285, 296 (2010). 
14  
public.41  Considering Congress’s emphasis in the ACA to expand access to care in the most 
cost-efficient way, it is up to state legislatures to embrace the potential of telemedicine as a 
solution to health care disparities and to enact legislation promoting the use of intrastate 
telemedicine, and cooperation in interstate telemedicine.  Given the interstate jurisdictional 
issues and the impact on commerce between states, a national standardization of telemedicine 
standards by federal law is the only other solution to widespread use of this method of health 
care delivery.   
II. Raising the Stakes:  How the Federal Government Can Continue To Incentivize Cross-
Jurisdictional Telemedicine Use 
While telemedicine has existed in the United States since the 1960s,42 it has recently been 
embraced in the market-driven health industry by health care entities, consumers and technology 
companies.  In looking for ways to save costs, health care entities seek out various ways to 
utilize technology.  With the widespread use of hand-held devices and access to the Internet, 
health care consumers have become more adept and conformable with services offered online or 
through telecommunications.  Furthermore, with devices and software programs becoming more 
advanced, technology companies are striving for more sophisticated medical devices for the 
market.43  Behind the advances of each of these forces, however, is the stakeholder that launched 
it all – the federal government.   
The federally-adopted ACA urges a shift in traditional notions of health care delivery – a 
shift that emphasizes cost-effective quality of care by expanding access to health care to all                                                         
41 U.S. CONST. amend. X; see Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (holding it is 
within a state’s police power to protect the public health and safety of its citizens). 
42 Lisa Rannefield, The Doctor Will E-Mail You Now: Physician’s Use of Telemedicine to Treat 
Patients Over the Internet, 19 J.L. & HEALTH 75, 78 (2005) (noting that NASA implemented the 
use of telemedicine in the 1960s to monitor the health of astronauts in space).  
43 Klein & Kim, supra note 1.  
15  
Americans, attempting to lower expensive emergency care costs, focusing on preventive health 
to lower health expenses, and doing so all while doctors are seeing more patients.  In accordance 
with these ideals, in 2011, the U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services issued a rule 
allowing a more flexible credentialing process for practitioners providing telemedicine services 
to beneficiaries, which would increase the efficiency of doctors serving Medicare and Medicaid 
patients while also expanding coverage for beneficiaries.44  Within two years, federal and state 
legislation expanded types of reimbursable telemedicine services for Medicare and Medicaid 
patients.45  Most recently, the trend has prompted the Federation of State Medical Boards to 
publish a model policy providing guidance for state medical boards in regulating the use of 
telemedicine technologies in the most efficient manner, suggesting what rules they should adopt 
regarding interstate use of telemedicine and solutions to potential licensing issues.46   
While this federal and national support has been beneficial to the expansion of 
telemedicine, and therefore access to health care, the complex matrix of differing state and 
federal regulation still remains the major barrier to the standardization and widespread use of 
telemedicine.   
A. Current Regulating Bodies 
Today, a number of overlapping and sometimes conflicting government agencies regulate 
telemedicine, with each regulating different and coordinating aspects of telemedicine 
implementation and regulation.  On the state level, individual state medical boards use their 
broad authority to hamper telemedicine practices in their state in any way the board sees fit –                                                         
44  Id. at 2. 
45 Id. 
46 STATE MEDICAL BOARDS' APPROPRIATE REGULATION OF TELEMEDICINE (SMART) 
WORKGROUP, FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., MODEL POLICY FOR THE APPROPRIATE USE OF 
TELEMEDICINE TECHNOLOGIES IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE (Apr. 2014), available 
at https://www.fsmb.org/Media/Default/PDF/FSMB/Advocacy/FSMB_Telemedicine_Policy.pdf. 
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with each state coming to varying conclusions and resulting in a complex mosaic of telemedicine 
regulations from state to state.47  On the federal level, federal agencies such as the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”), the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”), and the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information 
Technology (“ONC”) exist to regulate different aspects of cross-jurisdictional health care.  These 
federal agencies collaborate to develop a risk-based regulatory framework for health information 
technology (“health IT”) in order to avoid regulatory duplication and thereby simplify national 
telemedicine regulations.48  Within this framework exists any number of possibilities of agencies, 
which Congress could consolidate, and delegate the authority to regulate telemedicine on a 
national scale, which in turn, would hopefully promulgate widespread, interstate use.   
On the state level, medical boards are generally granted the power to regulate medical 
licensure and practice, including regulation of health care delivery through telemedicine.49  This 
broad authority can be, and has been, used negatively by boards seeking to restrict the delivery of 
services through telemedicine, such as the Iowa Board of Medicine that recently limited the 
services Planned Parenthood could provide via telemedicine.50  On the other hand, some state 
                                                        
47 See FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., TELEMEDICINE POLICIES: BOARD BY BOARD OVERVIEW (n.d.), 
available at 
http://www.fsmb.org/Media/Default/PDF/FSMB/Advocacy/GRPOL_Telemedicine_Licensure.p
df.  See generally Ameringer, supra note 12. 
48 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Proposed Health IT Strategy Aims to 
Promote Innovation, Protect Patients, and Avoid Regulatory Duplication (Apr. 3, 2014), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm390988.htm;  
see also FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N & OFFICE OF NAT'L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDASIA HEALTH IT REPORT: PROPOSED STRATEGY AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A RISK-BASED FRAMEWORK (Apr. 2014), available at 
http://1.usa.gov/1oBNDZZ [hereinafter FDASIA HEALTH IT REPORT]. 
49 Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S.  189, 191 (1898) (“[W]ithin the acknowledged reach of the 
police power, a State may prescribe the qualifications of one engaged in any business so directly 
affecting the lives and health of the people as the practice of medicine.”) 
50 See supra note 20. 
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medical boards have supported the efforts of the Federation of State Medical Boards in 
developing an interstate compact to allow for expedited state licensing procedures in order to 
promote the use of telemedicine interstate.51  Regardless of what type of support or barriers state 
medical boards implement for use of telemedicine, the breadth of their authority allows for local 
governance and oversight over telemedicine use from state-to-state. 
On the national scale, the FDA, FCC, FTC, and ONC play different, and at times 
coordinating roles in telemedicine oversight.  For decades, the FDA has played a major role in 
protecting the public health by national regulation of drugs and medical devices.52  Congress first 
delegated power to the FDA in 1906, to regulate interstate sale of drugs.53  Over time, this 
federal regulation extended to include food, drugs, and medical devices, holding the authority to 
ban devices entering interstate commerce, impose labeling requirements, and seize misbranded 
and fraudulent devices.54  By the 1960s, Congress continued to broaden the scope of the FDA’s 
authority, which emphasized Congress’s concerns with health and safety.  Under these 
amendments, the FDA made medical devices subject to the same pre-approval as drugs entering 
the market, and further, FDA’s medical regulations would now pre-empt any conflicting state 
regulations.55  This expansion of authority allows the FDA to efficiently regulate advancing 
                                                        
51 Kendra Casey Plank, Federation of State Medical Boards Release Final Interstate Licensure 
Compact Guidance, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 8, 2014), 
http://news.bna.com/hiln/display/alpha.adp?mode=topics&letter=T&frag_id=55877088&item=5
166&prod=hiln  
52 Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription Drugs and 
Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 
883, 886 (1996). 
53  Pure Food and Drugs Act, ch. 3915, § 1, 34 Stat. 768, 768 (1906) (repealed by Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040). 
54 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (2012). The Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 repealed the Pure 
Food and Drugs Act and expanded how the FDA can regulate medical devices. 
55 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 52, at 903. 
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medical technologies on a national scale, and acts a prime example of success for a national 
regulation scheme of health care delivery for telemedicine. 
The role of the FCC in telemedicine is different from that of the FDA’s as it relates solely 
to the platforms delivering telemedicine services.  The FCC establishes regulations for interstate 
and international communications by airwaves, covering issues of wireless technology, 
connectivity, and regulations for transmitters and other equipment.56  Regarding the transmitted 
information itself, the FTC develops regulations to safeguard the collection and use of consumer 
data and prevent breaches of consumer privacy that could lead to deceptive or fraudulent trade 
practices.  As the FTC is currently focused on health care competition, this agency may be vital 
in resolving the barriers of interstate telemedicine. 57  And lastly, regarding the privacy and 
protection of patients’ medical records, the ONC establishes regulations for certification criteria 
of health information technology.58  Charged by an executive order, it is ONC’s mission to 
“implement and use the most advanced health information technology and . . . electronic 
exchange of health information.”59  The role that each of these government entities plays in the 
technical aspects of telemedicine delivery and use, combined with FDA’s extensive national 
regulatory role, sets up a prime network of federal entities for a national telemedicine regulatory 
scheme.   
Further to this point, in 2012, the FDA, FCC, and ONC proposed a risk-based regulatory 
framework for health IT that would avoid regulatory duplication or inefficiencies.  In April 2014, 
the Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) released the draft report, which stated 
                                                        
56 See Klein & Kim, supra note 1, at 5.  
57 Id.  
58 Id. 
59 See generally About ONC, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.healthit.gov/newsroom/about-onc (last 
updated Aug. 11, 2014). 
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that the FDA, FCC, and ONC recommended a risk-based framework with four key priority areas: 
“promote the use of quality management principles; identify, develop, and adopt standards and 
best practices; leverage conformity assessment tools; and create an environment of learning and 
continual improvement.”60  While a majority of the report focuses upon how to draw support 
from stakeholders to implement these four focuses, the report also calls for the creation of a 
Health IT Safety Center as a “public-private entity with broad stakeholder engagement” whose 
purpose would be the governance of a “sustainable, integrated health IT learning system that 
avoids regulatory duplication and leverages and complements existing and ongoing efforts.”61  
This recommendation would be key to the smooth implementation of national telemedicine 
standardization.  By centralizing the health IT implementation efforts to one entity, telemedicine 
use on a national scale would be better simplified, standardized, and ideally, easier for use.  
Congressional action is needed as the catalyst. 
B.  Proposed Enactments 
With telemedicine on the rise and the federal government recognizing its cost-saving 
benefits, Congressional members have proposed three bills to promote telemedicine use within 
Medicare and Medicaid. 62   First, Representative Mike Thompson (D-CA) introduced the 
Medicare Telehealth Parity Act to broaden Medicare reimbursements of telemedicine services.63  
If passed into law, Medicare would extend coverage to beneficiaries receiving telemedicine 
services from originating sites that are Federally Qualified Health Centers and rural health clinics, 
and telemedicine providers would then include certified diabetes educators, licensed respiratory                                                         
60 FDASIA HEALTH IT REPORT, supra note 48, at 14. 
61 Id. 
62 See H.R. 5380, 113th Cong. (2014);  see also H.R. 3077, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 2662, 113th 
Cong. (2014). 
63 H.R. 5380, 113th Cong. (2014).  The bill was not passed into law during the 113th 
congressional session and therefore died. 
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therapists, audiologists, occupational therapists, physical therapists, and speech language 
pathologists.64  As of August 1, 2014, the bill was referred to the House Energy and Commerce 
Subcommittee on Health for committee consideration. 
Also seeking to expand telemedicine services to Medicare beneficiaries, the 
TELEmedicine for MEDicare Act of 2013, or the TELE-MED Act, seeks to relax Medicaid 
provider licensing requirements for those offering services via telemedicine.65  The legislation, 
proposed by Representative Devin Nunes (R-CA), would allow certain Medicare providers to 
surpass cross-jurisdictional licensing requirements when treating beneficiaries in other states.  
This bill has not left the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health since arriving 
there on September 2013.66 
The final telemedicine enactment currently before Congress is the Telehealth 
Enhancement Act of 2014, introduced by Senator Thad Cochran (R-MS).67  While this bill also 
focuses on telemedicine use within the Medicare framework, its focus is more directed towards 
telemedicine incentives.  The proposed language calls for the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to provide a positive incentive to certain hospitals to lower their readmission rates, 
authorizes expansion of telemedicine use by accountable care organizations (“ACOs”), and 
requires the FCC to relax their rules and disregard provider location.  On July 24, 2014, the bill 
was read twice and referred to the Senate Committee on Finance for consideration.68 
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66 Id. 
67 S. 2662, 113th Cong. (2014). 
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While these three bills may not go far in the current political environment, the language 
and the ideas behind them are a good start.  Providing incentives for telemedicine use, 
broadening the services included in telemedicine use, and most importantly, providing for a 
national licensing and standardization scheme would effectively minimize all major barriers 
national telemedicine use faces today.  Effective legislation, paired with the regulatory functions 
of the FDA, FCC, FTC, ONC, and the possible creation of a Health IT Safety Center, would 
provide an effective infrastructure for national telemedicine implementation – a solution to 
health care costs and access to issues that may not be too far off. 
C.  Need for National Regulation 
Although state medical boards have historically been the gatekeepers of medical practice 
regulation and oversight, the modern health care system, telemedicine in particular, calls for 
consideration of national standards and regulations for interstate transactions.  The traditional 
notion supporting state medical board authority is that health and safety issues are “inherently 
local in nature,” and thus the state is most qualified to handle them.69  And while that notion has 
been true historically, the context of telemedicine provides that an individual’s best access to 
health solutions is no longer necessarily within state boundaries.  With health information 
technology, patients may access national and international health resources through various 
telecommunications platforms and providers can easily access patients’ health records allowing 
                                                        
69 See Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (holding it is within a state’s police power 
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Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 
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for more complete treatment. 70   As modern health care delivery advances beyond state 
boundaries, so should the authority to establish standards and regulation. 
With the growing demands for interstate use of telemedicine and the growth of the health 
care system on a national and international basis, state regulation is becoming less and less 
appropriate in light of the Federal Commerce Power.  With the health care industry implicating a 
number of cross-jurisdictional transactions, interstate commerce is indisputably implicated and 
as such Congress has the sole authority to engage in the interstate regulation.71  And further, the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, indicates that the federal 
government may invalidate state and local laws for placing an undue burden on interstate 
commerce.72   
Without delving too deep into the intricacies of constitutional law, Congress can 
constitutionally regulate commerce among the states if the regulation passes the “Substantial 
Effect” test.73  Under the test, the regulation is permissible so long as it fits into one of the 
following categories: regulation of use of channels of interstate commerce, regulation and 
protection of instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or regulation of activities having 
substantial effect on commerce.74  Federal regulation of health care would concern use of the 
channels of interstate commerce, as telemedicine and other health care transactions frequently 
cross state borders.  Likewise, federal regulation of health care concerns the protection of 
                                                        
70 Amar Gupta, Prescription for Change, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2008, 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB122426733527345133. 
71 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 26-27 (1824). 
72 E.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 
340 U.S. 349 (1951). 
73 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
74 Id. 
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instrumentalities of interstate commerce and activities having a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce, due to the impact of health care on interstate economic activity.   
Additionally, a state law is deemed to violate the Dormant Commerce clause if it 
regulates a national subject matter – a designation defined as “imperatively demand[s] diversity, 
which alone can meet the local necessities.”75  While there are circumstances that allow a state to 
violate the Commerce Clause on the basis of police powers – one of which has traditionally been 
medical licensure – that exception is unlikely to apply here.76  The largest indicator that a police 
power exception argument would fail is the fact that national licensing alternatives are already 
successfully in place with federal entities including the Veterans Administration, the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs and the U.S. Military.77   
With the added commercial value and market-based nature of modern health care, as well 
as meeting the threshold of the “Substantial Effect” test, it is likely that Congress could regulate 
telemedicine on a national scale without confronting issues of constitutionality.  As such, today’s 
need for telemedicine as a cost-saving measure, as well as a solution to health care access 
disparities, necessitates that Congress step in to regulate telemedicine, utilizing the federal 
entities that have already been playing an integral role in the health IT infrastructure. 
III. Federal Government Going Forward 
The numerous barriers posed on telemedicine within the United States act as a detriment 
not only to new health care delivery technologies, but also the efficiency of our entire health care 
system.  With problems of access, resulting both from underserved rural areas as well as the                                                         
75 Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319. 
76 Id. at 314. 
77 Alison M. Sulentic, Crossing Borders: The Licensure of Interstate Telemedicine Practitioners, 
25 J. LEGIS. 1, 37 (1999) (noting that U.S. Military law allows any health professional who holds 
a state license to practice anywhere in the national as long as the care provided is directly 
affiliated with the Department of Defense). 
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recent influx of newly insured individuals resulting from the ACA, telemedicine works to 
provide a cost effective solution.  Efficiency of telemedicine can be quantified by the increase in 
access to care for Americans, by the decrease in medical spending costs from providers and 
insurance companies and by the increase in the number of patients that providers can deliver care 
to in a single business day.  While federal telemedicine support thus far has been slow and 
minimal, there is the looming potential for the right congressional enactment to cause all the 
pieces to fall into place, and a national scheme for telemedicine to be implemented.  The 
regulatory bodies understand and are prepared for their roles in telemedicine oversight, Congress 
has begun to develop the language needed to implement telemedicine on a national scale, and 
most importantly, Congress possesses the constitutional power to act.  National telemedicine 
oversight will expand access to telemedicine services for Americans, which leaves the last 
consideration: will patients and providers feel comfortable using telemedicine or will issues of 
liability and dispute resolution prevent its widespread use? 
IV. Mandated Arbitration as a Means to Promulgate Interstate Use of Telemedicine 
Just as the federal government supports this transformation in health care delivery,78 
insurance companies have moved to support telemedicine through reimbursement policies.79  
The trend is accompanied with a caveat, however.  Most beneficiaries using telemedicine 
services must agree to use non-binding arbitration for malpractice issues.  While arbitration often 
faces criticism of subjugating an individual’s right to adjudication, arbitration clauses may act as 
the solution that telemedicine needs to become widespread.   
  
                                                        
78 See supra note 43. 
79 Ann Nevers, Medical Malpractice Arbitration in the New Millennium: Much Ado About 
Nothing?, 1 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 45 (2000).   
25  
A. Arbitration in the United States 
In recent decades, arbitration has gained recognition as a legitimate method of medical 
malpractice alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”), as it is generally cheaper and quicker than 
formal litigation.  Federal and state courts encourage arbitration by directing cases to these 
forums with the parties’ consent, and even in some states, courts mandate arbitration for claims 
under a certain damage amount. 80   Additionally, parties may seek resolution through ADR 
without suggestion from the courts if they enter into a written contract with an arbitration clause.  
Where an arbitration clause exists, and one party seeks litigation, most courts will return the case 
to arbitration before hearing the case.81  Arbitration is often beneficial for both parties, as the 
parties are able to select by whom and how their case is arbitrated and what rules or procedures 
will govern the claim.82 
Arbitration in the United States was prompted by the passage of the Federal Arbitration 
Act (“FAA”) by Congress, which regulates the use of private agreements to arbitrate disputes 
and emphasizes a contractual approach to private arbitration agreements.83  Directly following 
the enactment of the FAA in 1925, courts largely rejected arbitration based on the reasoning that 
it denied individuals their constitutional right to adjudicate their claims before a judicial body.  
The FAA was largely unacknowledged until the “Rights Revolution” of the 1960s and 70s, when 
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Congress passed more protectionist laws, which in turn increased private individuals filing 
claims for adjudication. 84   As court dockets became overcrowded, judicial bodies began to 
recognize the benefits of arbitration to stand in as an effective and efficient method for claimants 
seeking adjudication of their claim.85  Throughout this shift, courts began to enforce and define 
the boundaries of the FAA, establishing that arbitration clauses must be enforced by courts, that 
the standards of the FAA preempt state law where interstate commerce is implicated, that state 
legislation treating arbitration clauses different than standard contract law violates the FAA, and 
most importantly, that settlement reached through arbitration is enforceable in a court of law.86  
Following these court decisions, arbitration became effective in two ways: first, there is front end 
enforcement of arbitration clauses from the FAA, and second, there is back end enforcement 
where judicial bodies approve and enforce the award coming out of arbitration.  As a result, 
arbitration has become widely successful in the United States, playing a large role in many 
business sectors, including that of health care.87 
B.  Arbitration and Health Insurance Companies 
Paralleling the growth of arbitration is the increased use of arbitration clauses by health 
insurance companies, indicating how arbitration has become increasingly a preferred method for 
dispute resolution between health care providers, payors, managed care plans, and other 
companies in the health care industry.  The cost, duration, and unpredictability of trial, as well as 
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86 Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (holding that state legislation treating 
arbitration clauses differently than other standard contract language is inconsistent with the 
FAA).  See supra note 77. 
87 Katherine Benesch, The Increasing Use of Arbitration and Mediation in Adjudicating 
Healthcare Cases,  N.J. LAW., Apr. 2007, at 25, 25 (noting that between 1996 and 2002, total 
arbitration filings reported by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) more than doubled). 
27  
the technicality of health care issues, are attributed to the rising popularity of arbitration in the 
health care sector.88  
Kaiser Permanente (“Kaiser”), a California-based nonprofit health management 
organization (“HMO”), has mandated arbitration among its members since 1971.89  Additionally, 
Kaiser pays for neutral arbitrators’ fees and expenses where claims are greater than $200,000, 
which further encourages the speedy and efficient resolution of disputes via arbitration.  As of 
2009, Kaiser paid for these fees in eighty-five percent of cases, ninety-one percent of which were 
medical malpractice disputes.  Kaiser reported an increase in this rate in 2013, noting that ninety-
eight percent of claims were medical malpractice. 90  Following the ACA, where individual 
health insurance coverage is mandated, the inclusion of arbitration clauses in health plans is an 
effective way to require arbitration before formal adjudication in medical malpractice claims. 
Although members are mandated by Kaiser to go to arbitration, and thereby waive their 
right to formal adjudication, a majority of members are satisfied with the results.  A 2013 report 
noted that sixty-seven percent of claimants felt that arbitration was better than a court system, 
and thirty-two percent said it was comparable to court.91  In comparison to the four or five year 
average for payouts from litigation in the United States, the time frame for alternative dispute 
resolution averages twelve months.  In 2013, Kaiser reported three quarters of cases closing by 
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parties’ action and a quarter closing by decision of the neutral arbitrator.92  Nearly half of the 
claimants received some compensation, either through settlement or arbitration hearing, with an 
average award of $449,027, within a range of compensation from $10,510 to $4,950,527.93  In 
comparison, a 2006 National Practitioner Data Bank report calculated that the median award 
arising out of litigation was $175,000 per patient.94 
Since the mid-1990s, health care disputes are increasingly being resolved through 
arbitration, or other types of alternative dispute resolution.  Most health insurance companies 
require dispute resolution via arbitration, and many states have statutes that require arbitration 
for all disputes involving health care parties.95  Its popularity has largely caught on due to the 
various benefits, including shorter duration and lower costs, the ability to choose expert 
arbitrators, the complexity of the issues, the flexibility of the process, limited discovery and the 
maintenance of privacy and confidentiality.96 
C. Arbitration and Telemedicine 
Just as arbitration is a practical solution for many health care claims, it acts a useful 
solution to telemedicine claims as well.  From the complex technologies of telemedicine services, 
to the issues regarding privacy of parties and medical records, as well as the numerous issues 
regarding choice of law and jurisdiction for interstate practices, the flexible, informal, and 
private nature of arbitration would allow parties to follow their pre-established rules of procedure 
and use technical experts for consultation and evidence as needed to best adjudicate the claim.                                                           
92 See 2013 KAISER REPORT, supra note 90, at x (finding 44% of claims settled, 27% withdrew 
and abandoned, and 5% failed to pay the filing fee or get the fee waived). 
93 Id. 
94 Deth Sao, Healthcare Disputes Across National Boundaries: The Potential for Arbitration, 42 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 475 (2010). 
95 Katherine Benesch, Why ADR and Not Litigation for Healthcare Disputes, DISP. RESOL. J., 
Aug.-Oct. 2011, at 52, available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_014003. 
96 Id. 
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The FAA would govern interstate telemedicine use, as cross-border health care 
transactions constitute interstate commerce, and state arbitration laws, on the other hand, would 
guide intrastate use of telemedicine, so long as state law is consistent with standard contract 
law. 97   This framework works well with the current health care system, as the federal 
government is pushing for more use of telemedicine at both inter- and intrastate levels, and the 
states are still protective of their citizens and jurisdictions. 
Interstate use of telemedicine raises the majority of issues with regard to its use in the 
United States.  With each state, through their state medical board, having the authority to 
regulate health professionals who practice within their state boundaries, the licensing and 
regulations can differ significantly from state to state.  Due to the inconsistency, the differing 
procedural and substantive laws governing health care issues raise a number of civil procedure 
issues for interstate litigation. 98   Rigid jurisdictional and choice of law approaches are ill-
equipped to resolve disputes arising from the cross-border movement of people and health 
services in the United States.99  Arbitration, however, would provide the flexibility needed to 
handle the complexities of telemedicine disputes, as the parties predetermine choice of law and 
procedural framework for the arbitrator to follow.   
The streamlined private adjudication process of arbitration provides a more efficient 
dispute resolution process that is more adaptive to changes in the health services industry than 
litigation and could open doors for telemedicine to expand.  First, agreements coming out of 
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arbitration are enforceable in all United States jurisdictions. 100   In other words, a decision 
involving parties in California and Nevada would be enforced by both states.  Second, parties 
avoid jurisdictional and choice of law concerns, because they consent to a set of procedural and 
substantive rules to govern the process and the choice of an arbitrator before the arbitration 
begins.  This would allow parties to decide which procedure would be followed beforehand, 
thereby sidestepping the cumbersome issues of choice of law confronted during litigation.  
Additionally, arbitrators are more appropriate decision-makers than juries in medically related 
cases due to the type of expertise needed to understand the case.  Parties in medical malpractice 
cases typically select arbitrators from a list of qualified candidates, and all candidates are 
required to be neutral and independent decision-makers by national laws, institutional rules, and 
international arbitration treaties.  The parties’ role in the selection of decision-markers 
contributes to confidence in the process and outcome. 
In addition to providing predictability in the decision-making process and a more neutral 
forum for aggrieved parties, arbitration offers a more efficient and more flexible approach.  First, 
discovery time and procedural time are both limited.  Second, given the arbitrator’s expertise, the 
amount of explanation needed to present the case is shortened.  Third, although the arbitrator has 
wide discretion, the parties determine the procedural and substantive rules of law.  Finally, the 
grounds on which a party may appeal are much more limited than those provided to a trial court 
party and such limited appellate rights facilitate a faster and more certain resolution of the 
dispute.  Should a party to arbitration successfully appeal their case, it will be reviewed by a 
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court of law, which often gives deference to the arbitration decision, so long as there is not clear 
error on the part of the arbitrator.101 
Arbitration is already widely in use for telemedicine disputes, in part because it is a good 
alternative for technically complex disputes and in part because health insurance companies 
widely require arbitration for members.  However, two (2) implementations must be made to 
further extend the benefits of arbitration and encourage the use of telemedicine.  First, a national 
standardization of telemedicine licensing must be enacted to allow for interstate practice of 
telemedicine.102  And second, to ease the use of telemedicine for physicians, consumers, and 
insurance companies, arbitration should be mandated for telemedicine disputes.  If Congress 
enacted a national mandate, requiring insurance companies to require non-binding arbitration for 
telemedicine services used by members, and where Congress has already mandated American 
citizens are members of health insurance coverage, the resulting effect would be a mandate of 
arbitration for all individuals using telemedicine services nationally. 
The FAA reflects the authority of Congress to support arbitration on a national level as a 
more efficient resolution process than litigation by rendering all arbitration agreements “valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for revocation 
of any contract.”  Additionally, this national support has been backed by the Supreme Court and 
is now recognized in all judicial districts in the United States.  The act upholds arbitration 
agreements and awards involving interstate and foreign commerce, the latter of which is possible 
                                                        
101 9 U.S.C. §10 (2012) (stating that the an arbitration award may be vacated only if (1) the 
award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evidence 
partiality or corruption in one or more arbitrators; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct or 
any misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers). 
102 Gupta, supra note 70 (highlighting the potential for patients to access top national and 
international health resources via telemedicine, so long as jurisdictional barriers do not impede). 
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because the FAA also incorporates certain international arbitration agreements into domestic law.  
Most courts have interpreted activities in the health care industry to be interstate commerce and 
thus subject to the FAA.  This interpretation means that arbitration contracts and awards 
involving medical malpractice disputes are easily enforced in the United States, as the FAA is 
charged with the duty of honoring these types of arbitration contracts.  Since arbitration is widely 
used by insurance companies today, taking the next step to ensure it’s use would further 
encourage the use of arbitration on a national, cross-jurisdictional scale. 
D. Downside of Arbitration 
Arbitration has been criticized over the years for a number of reasons, largely that lower 
costs and higher efficiency come at a price.  Due to the private nature of arbitration, it lacks the 
public scrutiny that can often benefit litigation.  Lacking the careful and criticizing eye of the 
public, with the added flexible nature of procedure, some argue that arbitration is a lawless form 
of dispute resolution.  Where parties have an issue with the procedure or outcome of arbitration, 
their ability to appeal the decision is very limited.  Courts, in recent decades, have been highly 
deferential to the decision of arbitrators due to the fact that parties select the neutral arbitrator 
before the proceedings begin.103   
The privacy however, is often an added plus in medical malpractice claims.  Through 
arbitration, the medical reports of patients and practices of doctors are kept private, keeping them 
from the public repercussions of public litigation.  Additionally, in business-to-business disputes, 
arbitration removes the hostility of litigant allowing parties to continue working together in 
future business settings, a common result for insurance companies and providers that often 
involve set contracts for coverage or business practice. 
                                                        
103 See supra note 98. 
33  
A particular criticism of arbitration of health care practices is how the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) acts as an obstacle.  The argument for 
raising HIPAA as a defense to arbitration is that where patient records are part of the evidence, 
that use violates the confidentiality of the patient’s individually identifiable health information 
protected by the Act.104  However, this defense does not account for the nondisclosure exception 
during the course of litigation or administrative proceedings, which states that an entity covered 
by HIPAA may disclose protected health information in the course of any judicial or 
administrative proceeding in response to a court order or administrative tribunal order if 
“satisfactory assurance” or a “qualified protective order” is obtained by the party seeking the 
information.105  Additionally, HIPAA provides an exception that a covered entity may use or 
disclose protected health information for payment purposes, meaning any time the issue at hand 
is related to payment, there is not a HIPAA issue at hand.  Even in the unlikely event that the 
Department of Health and Human Services held that the litigation exception did not apply to 
arbitration, the privacy of arbitration and ability to redact patient records would make it so no 
individual identifying information emerged from the claim.106 
E. Call for National Telemedicine Arbitration Mandate 
With the rising popularity of arbitration in health care disputes, the adoption of arbitration 
for telemedicine disputes is a natural and logical response to questions of liability in this growing 
area of health care delivery.  The success of arbitration is observed through its ability to help 
parties reach a practical and private solution to a significant and often complex problem.  
Applying this solution to telemedicine would not only resolve questions of liability in a more 
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105 Id; 45 C.F.R. 164.512(e). 
106 See supra note 95. 
34  
efficient and cost-effective manner, but it would also aid the growth of telemedicine use on a 
national scale by lessening concerns of liability held by health care providers and patients alike.  
The lack of a national, uniform arbitration scheme for telemedicine practices is a potential 
problem, as medical regulations and malpractice statutes vary significantly from state to state.  
With the implementation of a national mandate of arbitration for telemedicine services, the 
health care system would be one step closer to a national telemedicine scheme, which would 
improve the cost, access and efficiency of health care delivery in the United States.  
V. Conclusion 
When legislatures originally delegated the power to state medical boards to oversee the 
public health of their citizens, legislatures did so because medical practices were all local.  But, 
over the past hundreds of years, changes in both medical practices and technology have 
progressed such that health care now extends beyond both state and national borders.  As such, 
there is a need for Congress to enact national standards for telemedicine.  Not only does 
Congress have the power to do so, but the federal government is also capable of this regulation 
and oversight.  A national scheme to standardize telemedicine practices would expand access and 
increase efficiency in health care delivery.  Combined with a national scheme to mandate 
arbitration of telemedicine claims for individuals, Americans would both have the ability to use 
cross-jurisdictional telemedicine services, as well as the assurance that claims arising from 
telemedicine disputes would be resolved efficiently and appropriately.  While the barriers for 
telemedicine are many and complex, the solutions are within reach.  As technology continues to 
develop, so should the practice of telemedicine on a national scale. 
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Addendum 
Prior to the publication of this article, the Supreme Court of Iowa overturned the holding 
of the Iowa District Court for Polk County in the Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v 
Iowa Board of Medicine case.  As discussed above, the district court upheld a rule established by 
the Iowa Board of Medicine, which set certain standards for physicians administering abortion-
inducing drugs, thereby banning the use of telemedicine in the administration of such drugs.107  
Planned Parenthood of the Heartland (PPH) appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Iowa.  
On June 19, 2015, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the holding of the district court, 
finding that the Board’s rule violates the “undue burden” test established by the United States 
Supreme Court as the federal test for constitutionality.108  The opinion of the Supreme Court of 
Iowa demonstrates that state medical boards may have varying scales of power to limit 
telemedicine abortions depending on the jurisdiction.109 
While PPH challenged both the rule-making process and the constitutionality of the rule 
on appeal, the court found that the rule itself was properly enacted and it did not violate any 
procedural or rule-making provisions in the state code.  As such, the court reviewed only the 
constitutional issues.  Noting that Board did not violate any rule-making provisions of the Iowa 
Code Chapter 17A, the court draws attention to the fact that the Iowa medical board possesses 
the authority to properly enact restrictive rules so long as those rules do not violate the 
constitution.  This distinction highlights the fact that state medical boards in other jurisdictions 
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do have the authority able to enact a rule as restrictive as the rule in this case if they reside in 
those jurisdictions in which constitutional tests are interpreted differently.110   
The “undue burden” test established in the plurality opinion of Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey follows that a state regulation which has “the purpose or 
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable 
fetus” will be found to place an undue burden on a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy.111 
However, different jurisdictions apply the “undue burden” test differently.  For example, the 
Fifth and Sixth Circuits do not weigh the burden of the state statute or regulation against the 
burden placed on the woman, so long as the state provides a justification for an abortion 
regulation sufficient to pass the rational basis test.112 The Iowa Supreme Court, on the other 
hand – like the Seventh and Ninth Circuits – found that the test established in Casey requires 
consideration of the state’s justification for a statute or regulation weighed against the burden 
placed on the woman seeking to terminate her pregnancy.113  Here, the court overturned the rule 
for placing an undue burden on a woman’s constitutional right to seek an abortion, finding the 
burden that this rule placed on Iowan women far exceeded any health benefits the state claimed 
to be promulgated by this rule.114 
With Iowa being the first state to perform telemedicine abortions on a widespread 
scale,115 Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. acts both as a beacon for telemedicine, as 
well as a cautionary tale. On one hand, the opinion acts as an example of how telemedicine, as a                                                         
110 See Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583 (5th 
Cir. 2014). 
111 505, U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
112 See Abbott, 748 F.3d at 593-99; see also Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 
696 F.3d 490, 513-18 (6th Cir. 2012). 
113 Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc., 865 N.W.2d at 262. 
114 Id. at 269. 
115 Id. at 255 n.1. 
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medium of health care delivery, can expand access to patients in need, while also maintaining the 
upmost quality of care.  On the other hand, this opinion illustrates that state medical boards 
residing in other jurisdictions, namely the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, possess the power to 
substantially limit both telemedicine and healthcare due to political or other non-medical 
motivations. 
